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Abstract: Humans and artificial intelligences (AI) will increasingly participate digitally and 
physically in conflicts yet there is a lack of trusted communications across agents and 
platforms. For example, humans in disasters and conflict already use messaging and social 
media to share information, however, international humanitarian relief organisations treat this 
information as unverifiable and untrustworthy. AI may reduce the ‘fog-of-war’ and improve 
outcomes, however current AI implementations are often brittle, have a narrow scope of 
application and wide ethical risks. Meanwhile, human error causes significant civilian harms 
even by combatants committed to complying with international humanitarian law. AI offers 
an opportunity to help reduce the tragedy of war and better deliver humanitarian aid to those 
who need it. However, to be successful, these systems must be trusted by humans and their 
information systems, overcoming flawed information flows in conflict and disaster zones that 
continue to be marked by intermittent communications, poor situation awareness, mistrust 
and human errors. In this paper, we consider the integration of a communications protocol 
(the ‘Whiteflag protocol’), distributed ledger technology, and information fusion with 
artificial intelligence (AI), to improve conflict communications called “Protected Assurance 
Understanding Situation & Entities” PAUSE. Such a trusted human-AI communication 
network could provide accountable information exchange regarding protected entities, critical 
infrastructure; humanitarian signals and status updates for humans and machines in conflicts. 
Trust-based information fusion provides resource-efficient use of diverse data sources to 
increase the reliability of reports. AI can be used to catch human mistakes and complement 
human decision making, while human judgment can direct and override AI 
recommendations. We examine several case studies for the integration of these technologies 
into a trusted human-AI network for humanitarian benefit including mapping a conflict zone 
with civilians and combatants in real time, preparation to avoid incidents and using the 
network to manage misinformation.  
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Highlights 
• Managing the fog of war requires a trusted human-AI network for humanitarian benefit 
• Human error causes significant civilian harms even by combatants committed to 
complying with international humanitarian law  
• Humans in disasters and conflict use messaging and social media to share information, 
but international humanitarian relief organisations treat this information as unverifiable 
and untrustworthy 
• Trust in humans and machines is composed of multiple factors but can be improved 
through information fusion that incorporates diverse information sources, a 
communications protocol and use of distributed ledger technologies such as Blockchain 
• Protective AI used within a trusted network, can identify protected objects and persons 
and assist human decision-making in conflicts to reduce civilian harms. 
   
1 Introduction 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is widely seen by States as imperative to national security. As a 
result, AI-enabled systems will increasingly make their way onto the battlefield, both by 
militaries and by humanitarian groups working to provide assistance to civilians. While stated 
rationales for the use of AI tends to focus on improved military effectiveness and cost saving 
measures, AI also brings an opportunity to help reduce the tragedy of war and better deliver 
humanitarian aid to those who need it. However, to be successful, these systems must be 
trusted by humans and their information systems, overcoming flawed information flows in 
conflict and disaster zones that continue to be marked by intermittent communications, poor 
situation awareness, mistrust and human errors. 
This paper discusses practical steps to reduce the human costs of conflict and better protect 
providers of humanitarian assistance. We argue that this is achieved through the creation of a 
conflict communication standard for non-military and militaries within conflicts and 
indisputable record of communication transactions during conflicts. Shared information must 
be evaluated, justified and utilised to the satisfaction of individual parties in the conflict. A 
distributed ledger model of communication enables human-human, human-machine agent 
systems and machine agent-machine agent systems to build reputation and relay trusted 
Developing a Trusted Human-AI Network for Humanitarian Benefit 
6/12/2021 11:54:00 PM 4 
information within a multi-tiered network of checks and balances. The result is a safety net: 
technology does not take away from human decisions, but offers additional information that 
can help avert human mistakes that invariably happen.  
This paper is the first step; conceptualising and laying the groundwork of a human-AI 
network for humanitarian benefit. Next steps include value-sensitive design with stakeholders 
to civil-military communication in a conflict, implementation trials, and building TRL 
capability of the network in line with responsible innovation (van den Hoven, 2013). 
2 The Trust Challenge 
2.1 The Fog of War 
In Bomber Command at the start of WWII, British airmen experienced the fog of war1, 
including the cloud cover that hid the world from their understanding (Clausewitz, Howard, 
& Paret, 1976, Book ii, Ch.2.). Instead of modern global positioning, navigators relied on 
establishing pinpoints from the ground described as “groping” (Ch.3, Hastings, 1979). 
Wireless operators could pick up a loop bearing (Mason, 1992) from England, but a 
misjudged signal could turn the aircraft on a 180-degree reciprocal course and the Germans 
often jammed the wavelengths. Weather reports were inaccurate, blowing aircraft off course 
and speed. Visual confirmation of targets required flying so low that there was a high risk to 
crews from flak or enemy fighters. Lacking radar, communications between planes in 
formation was by Aldis lamps2 that required visual line of sight (Duffie Jr, 2017). Thus, even 
though explicit instructions from Command in 1940 were not to drop bombs indiscriminately, 
random results were the outcome3.  
 
1 The term “fog of war” refers to the state of ignorance in conflict due to ambiguity. Carl von Clausewitz is 
credited with the first examination of the concept, though he did not use that precise phrase—attributed to 
Lonsdale Hale (e.g., Hale, 1897). 
2 An Aldis lamp is a signal lamp that allows light to deliver messages via morse code.  
3 The locations of bombs was in fact, so random, that Germany was genuinely unaware that Bomber Command 
was intending to attack a specific target or region. Still, missions were still flown, as it was deemed important 
that Britain was doing “something” (Hastings, 1979) 
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War creates unique conditions for uncertainty via intentional and inadvertent causes. Much of 
the error of war could be reduced if decision makers knew more had access to improved 
accuracy and analysis of information (Lewis, 2019b)4.  Increasing the precision of weapons 
also increases the expectations of the civilian population that weapons will better avoid 
civilian causalities (Beier, 2003; Brown, 2007; Enemark, 2013; Walsh, 2015) Modern 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) technologies combined with precision 
effects have greatly increased the quality of justifications expected of decision-makers for 
their actions. For example, the information that guides a strike team into a compound after 
days or weeks of an ISR soak of the area can often justify (though not always) their actions in 
accordance with Commander’s intent5. But protecting non-combatants and identifying 
combatants remains difficult in conventional warfare in high tempo environments where 
combatants operate in the same area with civilians (Lawfare, 2020). 
2.2 Decision-making 
The ambition of humanitarian organisations in conflict is to increase adherence to 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC). There are 
three action components required to achieve this: Awareness, Intent (underpinned by “will”) 
and Capability (Lambert & Scholz, 2005). If decision-makers inside conflict zones, have 
awareness regarding what and where protected objects are, have the intent to abide by IHL 
and have the capability to follow-through, then better humanitarian outcomes are predicted. 
This paper focuses primarily on the challenge of awareness, acknowledging that awareness 
absent humanitarian intent or capability is ineffective and leads to a lack of trust.  
Awareness can be broken down into multiple concepts, include knowledge and 
understanding, but also awareness of degrees of ignorance. Knowledge has traditionally been 
defined as “justified true belief” and represents the highest epistemic goal (Moser, 2005; 
Sosa, 2011). Understanding may include causal mechanisms, reasons, explanations and the 
meaning of what is observed (Miller, 2019). However, given the uncertainties of conflict, a 
 
4 More data by itself won’t necessarily solve the problem if the structure or method of analysis cannot give you 
the insight you need (private communication with Dr. Beth Cardier). 
5 Noting that knowledge of one’s target does not ensure abidance with requirements of jus in bello and jus ad 
bellum obligations. 
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sound goal to maintain trust might not be knowledge, but something short of knowledge, 
such as rationally-justified belief, or evidence-based decision-making. The awareness 
demanded by alternate epistemic frameworks such as Bayesian epistemology (Bovens & 
Hartmann, 2004) and evidentialism (Conee & Feldman, 2004) is that an agent is justified in 
making a decision if they act responsibly and proportionately given the (often uncertain and 
incomplete) evidence. Bayesian epistemology also provides a normative framework to guide 
evidence selection, valuing both the independence and diversity of information sources. 
Traditionally military information and communications technologies (ICT) have depended 
upon fairly narrow sets of vetted information regarded with high degrees of confidence. 
Future military and non-military ICT will likely draw on an internet of things including drone 
sensor feeds, high altitude platforms, satellites, social media, text messages and so forth plus 
social media messages and AI classification and recommendations to inform awareness and 
actions. If actors within a conflict broaden the data sources they draw on, it both increases 
their uncertainty and increases the potential of their awareness. In order to trust diverse 
information sources, their evidential value must be appraised and integrated appropriately 
within a larger operational picture.      
Awareness of one’s own uncertainty is a virtue associated with intellectual humility. We 
argue that decision-makers who acknowledge gaps in their knowledge and understanding are 
less likely to make foolhardy mistakes. So, whilst decision-makers might strive for 
knowledge, they are justified in the fog of war to make decisions when a certain threshold for 
evidence is met and the perceived risk of inaction is greater than the risk of action. The 
higher the humanitarian risk, the greater the evidential expectations in accordance with just 
war principles of discrimination and proportionality (Coates, 2016). As ISR technologies 
have improved, so has the expectation for militaries to hold fire under uncertainty (Ekelhof, 
2018). 
Perhaps surprisingly, militaries that embraced Internet technologies for decision-making 
through network-centric warfare (Cebrowski & Garstka, 1998; Eisenberg, Alderson, Kitsak, 
Ganin, & Linkov, 2018) have not necessarily invested in smarter methods to improve 
humanitarian protections. Despite the recent rise of digital, artificial intelligence (AI) and 
autonomous technologies, precision targeting and layered legal review processes, systemic 
situational incomprehension continues to result in unintentional harms and loss of life—and 
civilians bear the brunt of harm in conflict.  
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2.3 Human Error 
The majority of casualties in conflict are civilians, with this harm compounded by 
reverberating effects of attacks (Nohle & Robinson, 2017; Roberts, 2010). Some of this harm 
is due to combatants that disregard requirements of international humanitarian law (IHL). For 
example, recent evidence uncovered by the New York Times reveal the intentionality of 
attacks by Russia and Syria on protected medical facilities (Triebert, Hill, Browne, Hurst, & 
Khavin, 2019). But significant harm to civilians can still occur with combatants committed to 
complying with IHL, such as contributors to the Counter-ISIS Coalition regarding operations 
in Iraq and Syria, or international forces operating in Afghanistan (Lewis, 2018). While those 
militaries conducted legal and policy reviews for every single strike, significant numbers of 
civilians were still harmed. Analysis of over 1000 incidents of civilian casualties revealed 
how this occurs in practice: while some cases were due to deliberate decisions that the 
military utility outweighed the cost to civilians, the vast majority of cases were due to human 
error. In these cases of human errors, either decision-makers missed indicators that civilians 
were present, or civilians were mistaken as combatants and attacked in that belief. 
Misidentifications were often a result of humans making judgments that a threat existed, 
either mis-associating intelligence with a specific location/individual or incorrectly ascribing 
hostile intent to observed behaviour. Such attacks often included a loss of situational 
awareness that could have helped inform a better engagement decision.  
These human errors are also seen in attacks on medical facilities, as observed both in the US 
attack on a Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) hospital in Afghanistan in 2015 and in multiple 
attacks on hospitals in Yemen by the Saudi-led coalition. Despite both reporting their 
location to military forces and displaying a red crescent sign, these hospitals were still 
attacked by military forces in the mistaken belief that they were military targets. Analysis of 
these inadvertent attacks reveals patterns of human errors both in deconfliction (since these 
structures were on the No Strike List) and in identification (since attacks failed to identify 
either the nature of medical facilities or the red crescent symbol marking the structure) of 
medical facilities (Lewis, 2019b).  
Real world operations show that the deconfliction process is particularly challenging in cases 
of self-defence and dynamic targeting. For example, in Yemen, the majority of attacks on 
hospitals occurred due to dynamic targeting. Likewise, the US strike on an MSF hospital in 
2015 was a dynamic targeting operation in defence of forces on the ground. Traditional 
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planning and intelligence preparation of the battlefield, including consultation of the No 
Strike List, may not be optimised for short-notice operations in dynamic environments.  
Likewise, the identification of medical facilities and other protected entities can be 
challenging in practice. Such structures may not be within established hospitals, instead being 
located in other facilities or even in tents. The practical identification measure of a red cross 
or crescent, originally from the Geneva Conventions of 1949, is not always sufficient for 
identification to stop attacks. Not only can the time of day or night and the presence of 
obscurants (e.g. dusty or cloudy conditions) affect observation of these symbols, but the type 
of sensor can also play a role. For example, a coloured marking will not necessarily be a 
discriminating feature for a pilot conducting an air strike using an infrared sensor, a type of 
sensor used by many modern militaries.  
In summary, while the law is clear regarding the protected status of civilians and of medical 
facilities in armed conflict, humans make mistakes, and the limited tools and procedures 
available on today’s battlefield for protection leave much room for such mistakes, with tragic 
results. The number of tragic attacks on medical facilities over the past few years point out 
the benefit of developing additional practical measures that can reduce the chances of such 
mistakes.  
2.4 A Human-AI network 
A tool that might be able to assist IHL abidance is the autonomous and rapid identification 
and classification of protected objects and civilians using AI and machine learning. However, 
unpredictability, challange of explainability and bias of AI algorithms might also increase 
risk to civilians (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2019). Additionally, the 
usefulness of AI may be undermined by both deliberate tricking or “spoofing” and the 
challenges of keeping algorithms up-to-date in a changing environment (Brundage et al., 
2018). Further challenges include the facts that telecommunications within conflicts remains 
volatile and intermittent; and that it is in militaries’ interests to exploit the fog of war for 
strategic advantage by obfuscating operations and intentions while striving to better 
understand their operational environment.  
Given then, that humans and AI systems have both strengths and weaknesses, we advocate 
that human strengths be applied to offset AI weaknesses, and AI strengths be applied to offset 
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human fallibilities. Such a human-AI network would also automatically record available 
information for potential legal review.   
3 Trusted Networks 
3.1 Diverse Information 
The rise of digital technologies in all aspects of life has changed information availability in 
conflicts and disasters, driving a new requirement to share among disparate groups and in 
new applications. Those experiencing disasters and seeking information about the disasters 
use messaging and social media, yet international humanitarian relief organisations treat 
bystander information as unverifiable and untrustworthy and these data sources do not impact 
organisational decision-making (Tapia, Bajpai, Jansen, Yen, & Giles, 2011).  
This situation appears to be unchanged today (Hiltz et al., 2020) with agencies “reluctant to 
use social media, especially to gather unverified crowdsourced data”. Compounding this, 
military signaling has traditionally been secretive and bespoke to meet the needs of each 
Nation and to keep operations unknown to opposing forces. Likewise, historically 
humanitarian organisations have avoided sharing communication technologies with militaries 
to ensure their neutrality and hence immunity from harm. Yet, smart phones and social media 
are readily used for many purposes by: State and non-State actors to incite and engage in 
warfare (Singer & Brooking, 2018); by humanitarian groups to communicate regarding 
humanitarian needs and provision of aid; and by local populations to inform the world of the 
impacts of military actions. There is an opportunity for these groups to exchange these new 
sources of information to better meet humanitarian goals, but such exchanges must satisfy 
several conditions including how to manage diverse information sources and accountability 
for messages sent. 
3.2 Information Fusion  
Trust is a multi-faceted relationship that may be asymmetric between human-humans, 
humans-AI and AI-AI involving dimensions such as competence (including reliability, skills 
and experience) and integrity (including honesty, motivation and character) (Devitt, 2018). 
Trust can be measured as a factor of disposition, situation and learning (Hoff & Bashir, 
2015). In some situations, a source may be trusted and in others not. Sources are also 
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distributed, so information must be fused to improve trust. A predominantly autonomous 
fusion scheme is needed that makes best use of an information network characterised by:  
• duplication (a diversity issue);  
• reporting errors and error propagation (a competency issue);  
• intentional errors (an integrity issue); and  
• cost in terms of access to sources and risk to validate (efficiency and risk issues).  
A scheme that observes all of these characteristics is hard to find in practice (Azzedin & 
Ghaleb, 2019). Most rely on high-trust protected sources (to avoid deception), or large-scale 
diversity to provide statistical evidence. Fewer still attempt to use as few sources as possible 
to maximise trust. A system that comprehensively attempts to tackle all of these issues called 
TIDY (Etuk, Norman, Şensoy, Bisdikian, & Srivatsa, 2013) is illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. The framework for Trusted-based Information fusion through Diversity (TIDY). 
In TIDY the trust model is based on subjective logic and enables discounting of reports to 
reflect the assessed reliability of the source of each report (noting all past reports are also 
used in this computation). The diversity model uses similarity metrics to structure the source 
population, so that similar sources are grouped together. Information sources with similar 
features are assumed likely to provide similar reports in a situation. Example features may 
include: organisational affiliation, known alliances, nationality, location for this report, time 
of this report, expertise, etc coded as numeric values. The source-selection module, uses 
knowledge of source diversity to sample the population of sources for evidence according to 
the assigned budget. Correlations of reports exploit knowledge provided in the diversity 
model. The knowledge base stores feedback on the fusion estimate with reference to later 
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observed ground truth. The knowledge base also holds behavioural evidence for sources in 
different groups with regard to report similarity. Based on the evidence gathered, both the 
trust and diversity models are updated to reflect new knowledge. In the case of the diversity 
model, a learning process may be initiated to maintain model consistency.  
The fusion approach minimises the adverse effect of large groups of unreliable sources that 
might collude to undermine the trustworthiness of the fusion output. Civilian-military 
information exchange needs to incorporate diverse information sources and fused. But this is 
not enough to create a trusted communications network. In addition, information must be 
neutral, secure and provide undeniable proof of receipt. Neutral means the network is not 
owned or controlled by any of its users, and its use will not compromise the impartiality of 
their missions. Secure means the information exchanged between military and civilian parties 
is authenticated, confidential and has a level of integrity commensurate with the authority 
from which it was sourced. For example, the integrity of information from trusted sources 
may be high, and from an unknown casual observer low. Proof of receipt ensures ongoing 
support for the course of justice, ensuring information receipt cannot be repudiated as a valid 
record. 
3.3 Distributed Ledger Technology 
A distributed ledger via Blockchain technology provides a mechanism for recording 
transactions between parties efficiently and verifiably, without the use of a centralised 
register (Crosby, Nachiappan, Pattanayak, Verma, & Kalyanaraman, 2016). Although 
theoretically not completely immune to being altered, it is practically extremely difficult with 
diverse and independent sources to compromise as any retrospective alteration would need to 
be made consistent with alteration in all down-stream blocks, and so requires a high degree of 
consensus6. Blockchain technology is provides automated, highly secure records for tracking 
data, transactions, contracts and even algorithm provenance across the public and private 
sectors allowing collaboration and integration across organisations without the need for a 
trusted third party, a network operator or a system owner (Efanov & Roschin, 2018; Peck, 
2017). Thus blockchain is ‘trust-enhancing’, providing some additional trustworthiness to 
information exchange through reliability, but note it does not resolve other features relevant 
 
6 (Efanov & Roschin, 2018; Peck, 2017). 
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to concepts of trust such as goodwill, encapsulated interest or integrity (Devitt, 2018; Jacobs, 
2020).   
Blockchain lends itself to public and open networks – even if intermittent7. Shared 
information, consensus, independent validation and information security are characteristics 
that make blockchain of particular interest to the humanitarian sector, in order to address all 
sorts of practical problems related to transparency, efficiency, scale and sustainability (Coppi 
& Fast, 2019). Messages on a blockchain cannot disappear or be manipulated, and the origin 
of the information cannot be disputed. Additionally, opposing forces and neutral 
organisations can quickly and directly communicate to one or more other parties involved in 
the conflict. 
3.4 Communications Protocol  
Organisations and individuals protected under humanitarian law in conflict and disaster zones 
need to identify themselves in order to prevent or minimise collateral damage. A 
communications protocol using blockchain might contribute to a trusted civilian-military 
communication network, allowing combatant and neutral parties in armed conflicts to 
digitally communicate (see Box 1. The Whiteflag Protocol). We argue that such a protocol in 
combination with an information fusion scheme could be used to assess the trustworthiness of 
information by instant verification of the originator, authentication of reliable sources, cross-
checking facts with persistent information on the blockchain to evaluate reliability of sources, 
confirmation by multiple sources, duress functionality, and implementation-specific measures 
such as filtering, blacklisting, other sources8. 
Box 1: The Whiteflag Protocol 
The Whiteflag protocol is a free and open standard for a digital communications protocol based on 
blockchain technology (Kolenbrander & Schless, 2019; "The Whiteflag Protocol," 2020). See 
Appendix A for the current, extensible, Whiteflag message set including protective signs, 
 
7 If telecommunications are intermittent, the distributed ledgers each record what information was available, 
where and when, to justify information available for decision retrospectively at the time, and then re-
synchronises the ledger automatically when telecommunications are re-established.   
8 Integration with other information resources, such as Truepic, a photo and video verification platform fighting 
disinformation (see https://truepic.com) has been demonstrated. 
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emergency signals and status signals etc... Whiteflag can be implemented for new and existing 
systems, (e.g. geographical information systems, command & control systems, mobile devices, 
beacons, transponders in cars, autonomic systems, etc.) and a variety of blockchain networks (e.g. 
Bitcoin and Ethereum).  
Whiteflag messages may be disclosed only to trusted parties, and be hidden to others, by 
using encryption; they can be made available to entities with limited visibility, e.g. beyond 
visible range, to smart weapons, etc.; their source can be verified to establish their 
authenticity; they cannot be manipulated by others, and their existence is recorded 
permanently with undeniable proof to create transparency and help the course of justice. 
For example, in an extremely hostile environment, humanitarian organisations may use 
Whiteflag encryption to prevent information becoming available to potential hostile 
parties.  
Whiteflag makes use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) that can be set-up in 
multiple ways. One way is to use automatically negotiated keys for secure one-on-one 
communication, eliminating the need for any prior coordination. In addition, more 
advanced implementations are possible, where multiple sets of encryption keys are shared 
between participants to create different trusted subgroups. Since Whiteflag does not reveal 
any information on the intended recipient of the information, and the originator may 
choose an authentication method that only reveals its identity to trusted parties, not only 
the information content itself is secured, but information about the communicating parties 
can also be concealed.  
Whiteflag has been verified and validated at Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 5 out of 9 (Jamier, 
Irvine, & Aucher, 2018), which means that Whiteflag technically works and the overall 
functionality is considered useful (Capgemini, 2018), but further operational test & evaluation 
activities are required to work out specific use cases, to identify and mitigate risks, and to integrate 
it effectively, safely and securely in new and existing systems. The Whiteflag software used for 
testing is open sourced and available on GitHub (Timo [ts5746]) and all test data is on the 
Ethereum Rinkeby Test Network (between blocks 3350000 and 6350000).  
 
3.5 Protective AI  
So far in the paper we have discussed the needs of decision-makers in a conflict to 
incorporate diverse information sources on a trusted network. It is at this juncture that we 
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would now like to consider how AI might contribute to building a more trusted network for 
humanitarian benefit. A recent study of software requirements related to social media for 
humanitarian and emergency management applications suggested AI in half their features for 
priority development (see Table 5. Hiltz et al., 2020). For example, AI has been 
recommended for dynamically extracting information and identifying damage and severity of 
harms in social media images including injured, trapped or displaced people. Understandably, 
there are moral concerns for the potential range of uses of AI in critical roles in conflicts. 
While AI is likely to be incapable of a level of reasoned action sufficient to attribute moral 
responsibility in the near term, we argue it might today autonomously execute human value-
laden decisions embedded in its design and in code. By doing so AI can perform actions to 
meet enhanced ethical and legal standards (Scholz & Galliott, 2018). We consider two 
conceptual possibilities with regards to embedded ethics within machines: MaxAI and MinAI  
A maximally-just ethical machine or “MaxAI” guided by both acceptable and non-acceptable 
actions has the benefit of ensuring that ethically obligatory lethal action is taken, regardless 
of engineering foresight. That is, MaxAI is a machine that could potentially make “life and 
death” decisions. However, a maximally-just ethical AI requires extensive ethical 
engineering and may not meet the human-based judgements required under IHL. 
Additionally reasoning about the full scope of what is ethically permissible, including notions 
of proportionality and rules of engagement is a hard problem. Arguably, such an advance for 
machines to comprehend the human condition seems remote. 
A minimally-just ethical machine or “MinAI” at the other end of the spectrum, could deal 
only with what is ethically impermissible. That is, MinAI could make “life” decisions. In 
conflict zones, these constraints are based around the need to identify and avoid “protected” 
objects and behaviours including lawfully-protected symbols, protected locations, basic signs 
of surrender (including beacons), and potentially those that are hors de combat. These AI 
problems range from easy to difficult, but not impossible, and technologies will likely 
continue to improve. A simple example is the ability for standard machine learning 
algorithms to identify symbols of protection, such as a Red Cross, in order to avert attacks. 
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Figure 2 illustrates application of the “Faster RCNN” algorithm9, to a mobile military 


















Figure 2. Example of open-source AI for detecting and classifying objects in a video stream including tents and 
vehicles, and within those object detections, the presence of protected symbols of the Red Cross.  
This technology, if implemented, could potentially have saved the lives of medical workers 
and averted damage to medical facilities in recent Yemen security operations (Lewis, 2019a). 
 
9 Shaoqing Ren, Kaiming He, Ross Girshick, and Jian Sun, “Faster R-CNN: Towards Real-Time Object 
Detection with Region Proposal Networks”, Cornell University ArXiv.org, 6 Jan 2016, available at 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1506.01497 
 
Red Cross (green) 
detected within 
object detected 
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Figure 3 illustrates examples from our own trials examining the potential for AI identification 
of surrender10.  
 
         
 
Figure 3. Highly-magnified examples of classifier detecting and classification as part of a video stream: (i) 
a person without uniform with a white flag, (ii) non-uniformed person with hands behind their head, and 
(iii) two persons each with hands in the air, which are separated from an AK47 gun. 
Noting that Faster RCNN combines detection, signified by a coloured box, with 
classification, signified by a label. When multiple detections and classifications are made, it 
is possible to perform rudimentary automated reasoning. For example, in Figure 2, the yellow 
boxes indicate a tent, and within some of these boxes, there are other boxes indicating a 
symbol of the Red Cross, which implies the “Red Cross is on the tent”. Protective AI also 
holds promise to track actions and change of state of significance, i.e. consider from the 
elements in Figure 3, the potential to detect surrender behaviour as a transition from a state 
where a person is holding a gun, then discards it, and puts their “hands in the air” separated 
from the “gun” on the ground.  
Design of systems to achieve Protective AI based on a starting point of MinAI, must consider 
its own weaknesses and errors (see Appendix B. possible decision states for MinAI-enabled 
weapon systems). The humanitarian value added by Protective AI is when the machine 
correctly perceives protected objects and the human does not. From the humanitarian 
perspective this is essentially the addition of a safety net: it doesn’t detract from anything that 
a human would do, and if a human makes a mistake, this is a chance for a machine-enabled 
capability to catch and correct that mistake. From the military perspective this is balanced 
 
10 Work undertaken by Cyborg Dynamics Engineering and Skyborne Technologies as part of a project for the 
Trusted Autonomous Systems Defence Cooperative Research Centre, see https://tasdcrc.com.au/ 
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against when the Protective AI incorrectly perceives an object as protected when it is legally 
afforded no protection, and a strike is inappropriately called off. The latter may occur as a 
matter of natural error and should be infrequent, however, if deliberately-caused through 
adversarial action this should be a matter for the creation of new legal restrictions related to 
perfidy.  
Any Protective AI needs an appropriate legal and policy framework to inform development 
and use. Some policies specific to AI and data protection might include: 
• Data used for machine learning object recognition, including object labelling shall be 
protected from tampering; 
• It shall not be permitted to train neural networks starting with weights derived from 
unverified data sources (due to the potential to have embedded adversarial examples); 
• Any delivered machine-learning system shall include not only the algorithm, but all data 
used in training (to ensure the executable code can be reconstructed); 
• Any delivered machine-learning system shall be reproducible and repeatable entirely 
from its algorithm and all its training data. Etc. 
4 A Trusted Human-AI Network 
Taking now the elements of human decision-makers, a communications network and AI, we 
propose a trusted human-AI network that adopts a civil-military communications protocol 
with diverse information fusion on a distributed ledger as illustrated in Figure 4. We call this 
network: Protected Assurance Understanding Situation and Entities (PAUSE). The PAUSE 
architecture mirrors trust relationships between military and civil authorities to increase 
efficiency and timeliness of information processing and exchange. PAUSE also makes use of 
AI and automation to extract, clarify, identify, categorize, locate, assess and most importantly 
fuse information from eye-witness sources (with variable trustworthiness) to improve the 
accuracy and accountability of decision-makers.   
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Figure 4. The PAUSE network relies on military and civilian organisations to bear responsibility for 
communication to the ledger including any human, digital and AI based information generated or used by these 
organisations. Civilians can broadcast including signs of surrender, proof of life and so forth. Civilian and 
military organisations could form their own judgments with regards to how to represent and respond to 
communications. In particular, civilian safety considerations must be managed if their messages put themselves 
at risk of harm by parties to a conflict. It might be agreed that an anonymity layer is required for civilian reports 
such as differential privacy (Dwork & Roth, 2014).  
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The PAUSE network recognizes that the locus of moral responsibility for any decision rests 
with humans, individually or within an organisation. Digital or AI assets support human 
decision-making. Humans must design AI and autonomous features within the context of 
human values using a human-centred approach (van den Hoven, 2013). 
An AI classifier used by the military belongs to a State and the State must take end-to-end 
responsibility for their AI, noting that Protective AI and digital resources might be open-
sourced. Many organisations, governments and militaries are actively progressing ethical 
frameworks to assist decision-makers in creating procedures and protocols for the 
development, testing, deployment, evaluation and adaptation of AI (International Committee 
of the Red Cross, 2019; Lopez, 2020). However, how to operationalize these frameworks 
within technologies is less advanced. In the first instance organisations must understand an 
AI’s training data, inputs, functions, outputs, and boundaries (Robbins, 2019). Then 
organisations must situate the AI within a network of information where its limits and 
affordances are appropriately harnessed and restrained. 
Protective AI and a civil-military communications protocol need to be “surfaced” in software 
applications in order for each organisation to use in accordance with their objectives and 
values. Technologies may be integrated within existing military and civilian software 
systems, or through new applications. For example, militaries seeking to abide by IHL are 
likely to want to layer data emerging from compliant communications with command and 
control data including military objectives and (ISR) data (Paul, Clarke, Triezenberg, 
Manheim, & Wilson, 2018). To better understand applications, we examine several case 
studies. 
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4.1 Case 1: Mapping a conflict zone in real time 
 
Figure 5. Example mapping of a conflict zone from a military perspective showing some protected objects and 
critical infrastructure, Whiteflag-compliant communications received from objects (white and green speech 
bubbles) and anonymised human observation reports (dotted boxes), combined with military analyses (blue 
reports) 
 
The PAUSE system case in Figure 5, aims to “map” the location of protected sites and 
critical infrastructure in a conflict zone with real-time fully-traceable updates to reduce 
uncertainty, ambiguity and error. In a conflict zone there will be transmitters and receivers of 
information. Transmitters include protected object beacons, protected object detection 
sources (from AI), computer logs, video footage, satellite imagery, audio recordings. Humans 
in the zone may be both transmitters and receivers identifying people in need of assistance 
and/or surrendering (see Box 2: Digital and Trusted Surrender). Civilian communications 
may need special protections such as being anonymised using techniques such as differential 
privacy(Dwork & Roth, 2014). Assets that are responsibility of local government, NGOs, 
ICRC, UN etc. may also be transmitters and receivers. Using PAUSE each organisation 
decides what kinds of information to incorporate. Each nation or organisation would also 
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create validation procedures for receivers, giving weight to information in relation to values, 
priorities and trust metrics. Transmitted data from some entities (e.g. ICRC) would be 
considered a trusted source. 
 
 
4.2 Case 2: Preparation to avoid incidents 
 
 
Box 2: Digital and Trusted Surrender 
Humans could use the PAUSE system to register and better facilitate 
surrender and there is the potential for radio or other beacons to signal 
surrender. These signals would be visible to Combat systems and may 
require new laws to prevent unwanted exploitation. To illustrate, if the 
PAUSE system were available to US troops in the Persian Gulf War, 
(United States, 1992), Iraqi combatant lives may have been saved as 
information of surrender could be transmitted via a neutral communications channel like Whiteflag 
from beacons and/or text messages. 
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Figure 6. A humanitarian organisation using PAUSE to evaluate the risks to a resupply mission for humanitarian 
aid to a hospital via Road A, B or C. Road B could be chosen to minimise the likelihood of contact with: 
military activities such as the aircraft and non-state belligerents in Area X near Roads A and B, or a military 
base and non-state belligerents in Area Y near Road C. Analysis of anonymised human observations may lend 
more credibility to the hypothesis that non-state belligerents are near road C and less likely on Road A. 
Best practice would be for States and organisations to incorporate PAUSE into their decision-
making to avoid violations of IHL. Actors are expected to act in good faith to avoid an 
accident. Not using information provided via PAUSE may need justification if it becomes the 
de facto “standard”.  Figure 6 illustrates humanitarian organisations use of PAUSE to de-risk 
plans.  In this scenario, PAUSE helps track the changing locations of protected objects such 
as the movement of medical supplies along Road B. Each organisation in a conflict should 
reassess any actions in light of this updated information.  
A particular challenge for civilian and military organisations is to come to terms with how to 
respond to different information sources. This is why we consider models of information 
fusion. Once a normative model for decision-making by organisations is adopted, then 
agreement from diverse sources might be trusted more than the aggregation of views from a 
set of more homogeneous individuals (e.g. highly connected within social networks) 
(Schmidt et al., 2017).  Information from trusted allies is likely to be weighted more highly 
than unfamiliar sources. Highly uncertain or contentious information might trigger ISR 
actions depending on the perceived risk of inaction. Thresholds for actions under different 
densities of evidence and under various levels of uncertainty would be decided within each 
State depending on their risk appetite and political will. Thus, the PAUSE network can be 
used to undertake a risk assessment of actions by both civilian and military groups. 
4.3 Case 3: Dealing with Misinformation 
The PAUSE network would enable organisations to establish appropriate levels of trust in 
sources and fusion of information with varying levels of trust and changing trust over time. 
This means that mistaken information or deliberate disinformation campaigns are anticipated 
and more readily identified and managed. Figure 7 illustrates a case where PAUSE uncovers 
military attempts to manipulate information and progress misinformation or disinformation 
campaigns.   
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Figure 7. Belligerents try to unlawfully spoof ISR-equipped drones into believing military targets are protected 
(see red square) or that protected objects such as hospitals are neutral or military targets. The PAUSE system 
provides countervailing evidence so that disinformation campaigns can be questioned and mistaken information 
corrected. In this way, AI is part of the information system with many checks and balances. 
Take for example a deliberate campaign to make protected symbols on protected objects 
unreadable to an AI visual feed or infrared sensor. If a military depended upon the AI 
processed inputs via drone feed to make decisions, then it could be fooled into believing a 
hospital was a legitimate military target. However, an AI within the PAUSE network would 
be augmented with counter veiling evidence that a hospital is at the stated location, moving 
decision-makers from fast intuitive Type I decisions to a more deliberate and reflective Type 
II thought-process (Kahneman, 2011) when appropriate. 
An alternate scenario is that military objects would attempt to spoof AI classifiers into 
believing they were protected targets by painting protected icons on their sides, such as a tank 
painting a red cross. In the first instance, a smart AI would not just rely on identifying a red 
cross, but also the silhouette of a tank so that it would be cognisant of conflicting 
classifications. Additionally, if the AI-generated results were within the PAUSE network, 
alternate evidence would suggest both a) the absence of a known humanitarian vehicle in that 
area, e.g. the vehicle lacks an official ICRC beacon or similar and b) the known presence of 
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military forces in that location, e.g. Satellite imagery reveals the massing of military 
hardware where vehicle is located. Militaries are likely to invest heavily in AI-design and 
complimentary ISR capabilities to autonomously sort through conflicted data to provide 
operators with timely advice on how to proceed. 
In sum, there are three responses to the disinformation risk, 1) a range of AI techniques exist 
to deal with these situations with a high degree of confidence and 2) the PAUSE system, by 
allowing organisations and nations to set their own information fusion methods, would 
provide data-driven techniques to address adversarial uses of AI technically. The distributed 
ledger of objects and behaviours within conflict zones offer a reliable means to capture 
evidence to support new laws to make spoofing AI illegal. 3) a civilian-military protocol over 
a distributed ledger allows cross-checking with other trusted non-AI sources 
5 Conclusion  
Although the “fog of war” limiting situation awareness may never entirely clear, it should not 
be held as the standard to explain away civilian targets, justify collateral damage, or give up 
on the pursuit of better technologies. In a world increasingly plagued by extreme events yet 
brimming with information, more proactive responses are needed. We have outlined our 
suggestion that a trusted human-AI network requires diverse information sources to be 
appropriately fused and a communications protocol based on blockchains for civilian-military 
information adopted. We have illustrated the potential for AI to process humanitarian and 
critical infrastructure information, but acknowledge the risks of dis- and misinformation that 
must be managed through individual, organisational and inter-organisational information 
optimisation. A trusted network based on these technologies holds the potential to improve 
the efficiency and timeliness of humanitarian actions in conflict and disaster settings. In this 
way, States, non-state actors, humanitarian organisations and NGOs might change the 
technical means by which they communicate in conflict without threatening their neutrality 
or security, while making reliable use of eye-witness materials and social media.  
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7 Appendices 
7.1 Appendix A. Whiteflag protocol functional message categories 
and examples 
FUNCTION DESCRIPTION EXAMPLES 
PROTECTIVE 
SIGNS  
Signs to mark objects under the 
protection of international law 
Hospitals, Safety Zones, White Flag, 
Humanitarian Convoys, Cultural 
Property, Medical Units 
EMERGENCY 
SIGNALS  
Signals to send an emergency 
signal when in need of assistance 
Emergency Beacon, Distress Signal 
DANGER SIGNS  Signs to mark a location or area of 
imminent danger 
Mark danger such as an area under attack, 
land mines, disasters, etc. 
STATUS SIGNALS  Signals to provide the status of an 
object, or specifically for persons: 
give a proof of life 
Personal beacon on individuals or 
confirmation of persons for assistance, 
status of critical infrastructure. 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
SIGNS  
Signs to mark critical infrastructure Roads, schools, utilities, water treatment, 
hospitals, power plants etc. 
MISSION SIGNALS  Signals to provide information on 
activities undertaken during a 
mission 
Intentions of objects such as convoys as 
they progress and adapt through a 
mission, deconfliction with military 
operations 
REQUEST SIGNALS Signals to perform requests to other 
parties 
Requests for area access, cease fire, etc. 
RESOURCE 
MESSAGES  
Messages to point to an internet 
resource with additional 
information 
Additional information from official 
websites on cultural property, minefields, 




Messages to send a free text string 
to clarify and provide context to 
other messages 
Supplementary commentary to enable 
further clarification of ambiguous events 
 
Whiteflag messages sent on a blockchain are pre-defined and based on international rules and standards for 
armed conflicts and disasters. This ensures interoperability between any Whiteflag-capable system and a 
common understanding between the communicating parties. The messages should be seen as digital equivalents 
Developing a Trusted Human-AI Network for Humanitarian Benefit 
6/12/2021 11:54:00 PM 30 
of physical signs and communication signals marking entities protected under international humanitarian law, 
critical infrastructures, emergencies, and danger zones such as minefields etc. These messages enable entities 
protected under humanitarian law to make themselves known in real-time to parties they trust for deconfliction; 
disclose real-time critical information to trusted parties to improve overall shared situational awareness; and 
allow organisations to notify others of their planned and ongoing activities. For natural disasters on the other 
hand, close collaboration between aid workers, affected people and the general public is important. In those 
circumstances, Whiteflag may be used openly with information made available by anybody to everyone to 
quickly create and disseminate near real-time information about imminent dangers, available aid, etc. to create 
shared situational awareness. ("The Whiteflag Protocol," 2020). 
 
7.2 Appendix B: Decision error considerations for MinAI-enabled 
weapon systems 





Protected  Protected  Protected  Correct 
protection 
Protection achieved 
Protected Protected  Not Protected Correct 
protection 
Protection achieved as human 
prohibits machine to engage. 
Protected Not protected Protected Correct 
protection 
Protection achieved as machine 
prohibits engagement 
Protected Not protected  Not protected Protection fail Protection failure  
Not protected Protected Protected False protection Military objective not achieved 
Not protected Protected Not protected  False protection Military objective not achieved 
as human prohibits machine to 
engage 
Not protected Not protected Protected False protection Military objective not achieved 
as machine prohibits engagement  
Not protected Not protected  Not protected  Unprotected Military objective achieved 
within IHL/ILAC-boundaries 
. 
 
